

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.129
8 May 1963
ENGLISH

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

AUG 13 1963

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-NINTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 8 May 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. M.T. MBU

(Nigeria)

63-14561

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO
Mr. E. HOSANNAH
Mr. S. PORTELLA de AGUIAR

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. S.F. RAE
Mr. R.M. TAIT
Mr. C.T. STONE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA
Mr. V. PECHOTA
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. J. BLAZIK

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU
Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. O. NEDA
Mr. S. SERBANESCU

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. E. CORNELL

Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. S. AHMED
Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN
Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS
Mr. D.E. MARK
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria) I declare open the one hundred and twenty-ninth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): I should like to thank the representatives who have consented to my speaking first, since I shall have to leave before the meeting is over in order to fulfil an engagement to speak about disarmament elsewhere.

For almost two months our discussion on general and complete disarmament has been focused on how nuclear weapons delivery vehicles are to be reduced and eventually eliminated; and since that is one of the most important single problems which we have to solve, the Canadian delegation feels that the time which we have spent on it should not be begrudged.

However, there are still wide differences of position on the subject which remain to be overcome, as our debate has shown. On the Western side we had hoped that the proposal (A/PV.1127, provisional, p. 38-40) submitted by Mr. Gromyko in the General Assembly last autumn meant that the Soviet Union was now prepared to negotiate the reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in a more flexible way than hitherto. We looked forward to hearing that proposal elaborated in some detail in this Conference; and we hoped that, after its merits had been weighed against the relevant provisions in the United States draft outline treaty (ENDC/30), a common approach to the problem would gradually emerge.

At the last meeting which the Committee devoted to discussion of general and complete disarmament, on 24 April, the representative of the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.124, p.12) interpreted the Western efforts to find the meaning of the Gromyko proposal as an attempt to obstruct the work of the Conference. I should like to assure Mr. Tsarapkin that the interventions of the Canadian delegation -- and those of other Western delegations -- have had only one purpose: we have been trying to get enough information about the present position of the Soviet Union on the reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles to enable us to evaluate it with some confidence. It is the delegations which will not clarify their own positions, and not those which seek to understand the positions of others, which in our opinion delay the progress of our negotiations.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The Soviet representative has said -- and will doubtless repeat -- that he has told the West all it needs to know at this stage about the Gromyko proposal. I notice, however, that at the meeting on 24 April Mr. Tsarapkin drew a distinction between the questions that the Western representatives had posed. He said.

"Some of these were questions of substance, but most of them had no direct bearing on the issues under discussion." (ibid.)

We suppose that he feels he has answered the questions of substance; but we cannot agree that he has. Perhaps it would be useful if I were to divide the questions which we have asked into broad categories, and then to examine the nature of the replies we have received. That might help to determine whether or not Mr. Tsarapkin is right in saying that the West has received adequate clarification of the present Soviet position.

There are three main points which Western questioning has sought to clear up about the Soviet proposals on disarmament in the field of nuclear weapon vehicles as the Soviet position is now summarized in article 5 of the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2/Rev.1).

The first concerns the object which, in the view of the Soviet Union, implementation of the Gromyko proposal would achieve. A number of Western representatives, including myself, have suggested that the Gromyko proposal apparently aims to establish, at a fairly early stage in the disarmament process, a situation in which the major Powers would be able to deter aggression with nuclear weapons by means of long-range nuclear weapon vehicles, balanced between them and at a level substantially below what they possess today -- in short, it seemed to us, a position of balanced minimum deterrence.

In suggesting in my statement on 3 April (ENDC/PV.117, p.8) that that might be the underlying concept of the Gromyko proposal it was not my purpose to criticize it but, on the contrary, to show its similarity to some Western thinking on the problem which it seemed to me would make for acceptance of the general idea on which it was based.

If both sides were to agree that during the disarmament process a progressive reduction in the level of deterrent capacity in the field of nuclear weapon vehicles was to be accomplished, and that towards the later stages of the process the balance of mutual deterrence was to be struck at a very low level pending the final elimination of all major armaments, we should then have taken a very important step

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

towards creating a common basis for the negotiation of definite measures which would translate that agreed aim into reality. I cannot see why Mr. Tsarapkin has chosen to deny that the proposal has anything to do with a theory of deterrence, whether it be maximum or minimum. On 24 April, having rejected (ENDC/PV.124, p.16) an attempt on my part to describe the Gromyko proposal in terms of a theory of minimum deterrence, Mr. Tsarapkin then stated that in fact the retention of a limited number of missiles on both sides until the end of stage II would --

"... no doubt serve as a deterrent against any temptation to conceive aggressive plans or intentions, and would thus serve as a definite guarantee against possible aggression." (ibid., p.19)

Mr. Tsarapkin appears to have contradicted himself. I hope he will carefully consider what I have just said and give a reasoned reply at a future meeting to it and to other observations of Western delegations which contain the same idea.

The second important point which Western representatives have tried in vain to clear up concerns the numbers and specific types of nuclear weapon vehicles which the Soviet Union believes should be retained by the two sides until the end of stage II. In my statement on 3 April I indicated (ENDC/PV.117, pp. 6 et seq.) some of the important factors which should be taken into account when considering how to establish a balance at a low level in the deterrent capacity of the nuclear Powers early in the disarmament process -- I repeat, early in the disarmament process.

In reply to Western questions on the subject, all Mr. Tsarapkin has told us is that the Soviet Union considers that the number of the retained weapons should be "minimal" and that the agreed level should be such as to prevent the possibility of a nuclear missile war breaking out (ENDC/PV.124, p.18). These so-called criteria are too vague to give the Western Powers any idea of what the Soviet Union really has in mind. What does "minimal" mean? Presumably, as few as possible. But how few is that? On the other hand, there should be enough of these weapons to prevent the possibility of a nuclear missile war breaking out. But how many is that? The Soviet representative evades citing any numbers to meet these criteria, and asks the United States representative to come forward with a numerical answer. We cannot understand why he adopts that attitude. The Soviet representative has pretty full information on how many intercontinental ballistic missiles and other nuclear weapon vehicles the United States and the United Kingdom have, thanks to the reports of the Western Press and debates in the Congress and in the British Parliament. So why could he not state an approximate figure for the intercontinental ballistic missiles to be retained? Surely in formulating its proposals the Soviet Government must have had some figure in mind.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

In contrast to that vagueness of the Soviet proposal, the United States plan (ENDC/30) contains specific proposals for the extent of the reductions which would be undertaken in all categories of major armaments in each stage of the disarmament process. It also contains definite provisions concerning how the reductions would be phased through all three stages of the disarmament programme. The Soviet plan, (ENDC/2/Rev.1), on the contrary, gives us no indication either of how we would reduce from the present situation to the levels envisaged at the end of stage II, or of what those stage II levels should be.

The third category of questions which we have asked concerns the problem of verification. I presume Mr. Tsarapkin regards them as questions of substance, since he has offered a number of interesting comments about the Soviet attitude to this matter. He has said that the Soviet Union agrees that the destruction of nuclear weapon vehicles should be adequately controlled and, further, that the weapons which it is agreed should be retained to the end of stage II should be verified (ENDC/PV.120, pp. 40 et seq.). However, on 24 April he seemed to be saying that the possibility that States might conceal a number of nuclear weapon vehicles in excess of the agreed levels was of little importance. He said:

"But let us assume that, even when appropriate control had been organized, a party violating the treaty not only decided to conceal but even succeeded in concealing a few missiles or in adapting a certain number of civilian aircraft as carriers of nuclear weapons. Would this mean that such a number of means of delivery would be added to the agreed small number of retained missiles that the party violating the treaty could decide to start a war with the hope of success?" (ENDC/PV.124, pp. 19, 20)

The answer to the Soviet representative's question would, it seems to me, depend on the level of weapons which it had been agreed States would retain to the end of stage II, and also on how many missiles the potential violator had succeeded in concealing.

Suppose "the agreed small number of missiles" was ten. Then, if one side could conceal thirty missiles -- and, without a very thorough search, that would be possible in a country of great territorial extent --- aggression, or more probably nuclear blackmail, would be possible. If, on the other hand, the "agreed small number of missiles" was 200 or so, then the concealment of enough missiles to give a calculated nuclear warfare superiority would be almost impossible, with even much less extensive

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area search and inspection for verification. So, in asking that question, Mr. Tsarapkin has implicitly recognized how legitimate it is for the West to want to obtain a clear understanding about how many weapons the Soviet Union believes should be retained to the end of stage II, and also about what verification procedures the Soviet Union would be prepared to accept in order to reduce to a minimum the danger that any State would be able successfully to conceal nuclear weapon vehicles in excess of the agreed levels.

I have outlined briefly a number of the major questions we have asked about the Gromyko proposal. We regard them as questions of substance, and I believe that Mr. Tsarapkin must also recognize them as such. Unfortunately, his replies to date simply do not cover adequately the points which the West is convinced must be explained if the Soviet Union expects us to take the Gromyko proposal seriously. The Canadian delegation has suggested before that, if the Soviet delegation does not wish to state its position on any of these points publicly in plenary meetings, it would be easy to open private conversations here with the other nuclear Powers to explore the ground without commitment.

Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): Today I should like to make a few remarks on the question of general and complete disarmament, but first I should like to deal with the general situation in our negotiations.

At our recent meetings many of the representatives here have expressed their concern at the unsatisfactory results of our negotiations, both on the main question on the agenda --- general and complete disarmament -- and on the questions of a nuclear weapon test ban and the preparation of concrete measures aimed at the lessening of international tension.

At the same time the representatives pointed out that the incessant growth of nuclear armaments, accompanied by such disturbing phenomena of the present international situation as the continuing atmosphere of tension and mistrust in the relations between States, is increasing the danger of a universal nuclear conflict. It is this that strengthens us in our conviction that only general and complete disarmament, together with immediate measures to halt the arms race and to improve the international atmosphere, can avert this fateful threat.

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

At the same time we are fully aware that the difficulty of the tasks facing the Eighteen-Nation Committee in this regard calls not only for real efforts on the part of all the delegations but, first and foremost, for a readiness to come to an agreement. Without such readiness and the will to agree, our negotiations will dissolve in a mass of empty words and only vain illusions of continuing negotiations will cover up the tremendous abyss towards which the present military and political developments are driving mankind.

It is not difficult to define the criteria by which we must measure the sincerity of the desire of individual groups of States to achieve radical progress in our negotiations. The main yardstick --- as in other fields of international relations --- is whether a particular approach or proposal is motivated by the general interests of mankind, by the interests of consolidating peace and the security of the peoples, or by the narrow group interests of individual States striving to acquire for themselves strategic or political advantages. It is quite obvious that negotiations in which one of the sides acts from a position alien to the common aims of all the peoples cannot lead to any positive results.

This is precisely the situation which, in our opinion, has now come about in our Committee in discussing the question of general and complete disarmament and even other questions on our agenda.

The socialist delegations have from the very outset put forward the demand that in working out a programme of disarmament our main attention should be directed towards eliminating the material means for unleashing a thermonuclear war. Under present conditions this means neutralizing the means of nuclear attack, and in the first place eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

In our opinion, the nature and scope of the measures envisaged for the initial stage of general and complete disarmament must comply with this fundamental prerequisite. Without it disarmament will remain an impracticable illusion, since the relations between States will, as before, be determined by the factors which today threaten the peace and security of all mankind. Foremost among such factors is the notorious policy "from a position of strength", and the policy of nuclear deterrence which is being applied by the Western Powers in various ways. We know what role is being played by rockets and other means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the implementation of the Western nuclear strategy. It is no mere accident that, even in the process of the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the Western Powers do not wish to give up these means and with them the possibility of unleashing a nuclear war at a suitable moment.

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How else can we explain their negative attitude towards the proposal (A/PV.1127, provisional, p.38-40) to eliminate the means of delivery of nuclear weapons which was submitted to the seventeenth session of the General Assembly by the Soviet Foreign Minister Mr. Gromyko? The concepts underlying this proposal, as well as the entire draft treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Government (ENDC/2/Rev.1), are perfectly clear. Their main purpose is to achieve agreement that decisive measures to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war should be taken in the very first stage of general and complete disarmament. This was stressed not only when the proposal was submitted, but also throughout all our negotiations. In our opinion the Western Powers cannot be unclear or have any doubts in this regard, as they are always trying to make us believe.

Likewise, the substance and basic principles of the Soviet proposal are formulated with sufficient clarity and, furthermore, have been explained in detail by the Soviet delegation in our Committee. The gist of this proposal is that the Soviet Union and the United States would retain until the end of stage II a certain, precisely-defined number of means of delivery of nuclear weapons, the types of which would be agreed beforehand. Since the classification of means of delivery used in the Soviet proposal is similar to that used in the West, there should be nothing unclear to the Western delegations in this regard.

In regard to the number of those means of delivery which would be retained by the two great Powers, the Soviet proposal lays down a clear principle to be used as a basis. There would be retained only a minimal number of means of delivery, which would provide sufficient guarantee against aggression but at the same time would not enable these means of delivery to be used for aggressive purposes. In regard to determination of the specific number of means of delivery of individual categories, we consider fully justified the Soviet delegation's view that this question should be settled during further negotiations with due regard to the rightful interests of both sides.

But despite these facts the delegations of the Western Powers are continuing to take a negative attitude towards the Soviet Union's proposal and, in fact, are avoiding a business-like discussion of it. In support of their position they try to put forward all sorts of objections which in our opinion have nothing at all to do with the substance of the proposed measures. Their real motive is their lack of readiness to agree, not only to effective measures to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war, but even to any serious negotiations at all on these measures.

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

One of the most frequently used "arguments" of the Western Powers is the assertion, already refuted over and over again, that it is necessary to maintain some sort of balance of military forces throughout the process of implementation of general and complete disarmament. Under this slogan, which has nothing to do with the agreed principle of balanced disarmament measures, lurks the desire of the Western Powers to retain unlimited possibilities of carrying on even during the implementation of general and complete disarmament their reckless gambling with the fate of humanity. In this connexion I should like to recall the apt remarks characterizing this concept of the Western Powers made on 24 April by the representative of Poland, Mr. Blusztajn:

"The quest for a balance of forces justifies arbitrary acts; it serves as a pretext for accelerating the armaments race and taking military measures which endanger others' security." (ENDC/PV.124, p.6)

The correctness of this conclusion has been shown by present developments. Under the pretext of "balance of forces" the Western Powers are giving new impetus to the nuclear armaments race and are striving by every political and military means to acquire strategic advantages; through their plans for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force they are bringing more and more States into their "nuclear club", including West Germany, which is openly striving after revenge for the defeat of the Hitlerites in the Second World War.

In this connexion I should like to make a few additional remarks on the United States plan (ENDC/30). The measures envisaged in the United States plan for the first two stages are in fact limited to the field of conventional armaments. The question of nuclear weapons is postponed until the third stage. It has already been pointed out repeatedly that under the United States plan a nuclear war would not be precluded even after the completion of general and complete disarmament. Nowhere does this plan mention prohibition of nuclear weapons. It is also well known that the United States delegation has openly acknowledged in our previous negotiations that the United States Government does not exclude the possibility of transferring nuclear weapons to so-called international armed forces. As regards the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, the United States plan limits itself in the first two stages to measures which in fact would in no way affect the ability of individual States to unleash a nuclear war.

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Furthermore, the United States plan in fact even further reinforces the monopolistic position of the nuclear Powers during the process of general and complete disarmament. While other States of the world would progressively reduce and gradually eliminate their conventional armaments and thereby deprive themselves of their means of defence, the striking capabilities of the nuclear Powers would increase as a result of their retention of nuclear armaments and means of delivery. If we view this circumstance from the standpoint of the military and political concepts of the North Atlantic Treaty, we cannot escape the fact that the intention of the Western Powers is to acquire in that way a superiority of forces in the world during the implementation of general and complete disarmament.

We are bound to draw attention to this dangerous circumstance, which in our opinion distorts the meaning and purpose of general and complete disarmament. The delivery of mankind from the threat of war and the safeguarding of the freedom and peaceful development of all nations are synonymous in the dictionary of all peace-loving people. The possibility of nuclear blackmail makes the freedom of the peoples illusory and can lead only to a further aggravation of international relations and increased danger of a world-wide conflict.

At our meeting of 27 March the representative of the United States vainly tried to show that the United States plan provides concrete measures for the elimination of nuclear weapons already in the first and second stages (ENDC/PV.114, pp.41,42). But the fact **is** that in the first two stages no measures would be carried out which would limit nuclear armaments; on the contrary, their production would be continued in the second stage. The United States plan envisages in the first and second stages only certain restrictions on the further production of fissionable materials intended for the manufacture of nuclear weapons and, in case of need, for the transfer of a certain quantity of such materials to peaceful purposes.

There is no doubt that in the present situation such measures have nothing to do with nuclear disarmament. Above all, at the present time such stockpiles of nuclear weapons are in existence that even if their further production ceased, this would not affect the ability of individual States to unleash a nuclear war. The same holds true for fissionable materials. At the present time there exist such stockpiles of fissionable materials that even the immediate cessation of their further production and the possible transfer of a certain quantity to peaceful uses, as the United States Government **proposes**, would not seriously affect the further production of nuclear weapons or the stockpiles of fissionable materials accumulated in past years.

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

All these circumstances confirm what is, in our opinion, the only possible conclusion. The opposition of the United States and the other Western Powers to the adoption of the Soviet Union's proposal for the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage is not determined by those far-fetched objections which have been put forward by the delegations of the Western Powers in our negotiations. The real reasons must be sought elsewhere. They spring from the fact that the Soviet Union's proposal calls for the implementation of radical measures to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war, whereas the United States and its NATO allies are interested in retaining the possibility of unleashing such a war. Therein lies the main problem of our present negotiations, the main obstacle hindering the achievement of any progress whatsoever in this matter.

In the light of these facts there emerges a very plastic picture of the real state of our negotiations. There stands out very clearly the manifest contradiction between the statements of the representatives of the Western Powers regarding their interest in the implementation of general and complete disarmament and the cessation of nuclear tests, and their actions which are preventing the achievement of an agreement. It appears that the United States and its allies, if they are at all prepared to come to agreement, want to do so only under such conditions as would enable them to obtain unilateral advantages.

It would really be absurd to think that the Western Powers could achieve such aims in any way. On the other hand, it must be emphasized that if they continue to approach our negotiations from this position, and if in the future they are going to strive in their proposals to secure the fulfilment of demands aimed at achieving such aims, this can have no other result than further delays and failures in our negotiations.

In this connexion, however, the doubt arises whether the Western Powers are interested at all, in spite of their assertions, in the progress of these negotiations on general and complete disarmament. If they are, why do they continue to block the negotiations by stubbornly insisting on their untenable positions?

Many people who have been following the work of our Committee often ask why, if it is generally recognized that the dangerous consequences of the developments in the field of nuclear armaments categorically emphasize the urgent necessity of concluding as quickly as possible an agreement on the prohibition of tests and a treaty on general and complete disarmament, in negotiations in our Committee are

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making no headway. Why is it at present that our Committee is marking time and the discussions in it mean just a waste of time for all the participants? Is it that the obstacles which have been piled up in the path of our negotiations are so great, or have they been created only as a tactical pretext to prevent the achievement of agreement on disarmament measures, since such agreement would run counter to the real political purposes of the United States and its allies?

We believe that certain steps taken by the Western Powers in foreign policy leave little room for doubt. We have already stated here many times that it would show inexcusable naiveté on our part if we were to lose sight of these external circumstances, this external background of our negotiations, or if we were to discuss the various problems on the agenda of our negotiations in an unnatural political vacuum, in isolation from the reality of present international relations.

It is precisely when we compare the actions of the Western delegations in this Committee and the measures undertaken by their governments in the field of foreign policy, that we are led to the conclusion that the Western Powers are not prepared to abandon the dangerous policy of feverish arming which they have been carrying out so far. As a result of this, neither the United States nor its allies are prepared at the present time to enter into any agreement touching disarmament.

And this is precisely the obstacle which is preventing us from achieving positive results in our negotiations. No objective obstacles, no exaggerated danger of upsetting the balance of forces, as they claim, and no apprehensions about "a leap in the dark" (ENDC/PV.126, p. 31) are the real reason why our negotiations are not moving forward. The real reason lies in the lack of readiness of the Western Powers to enter into an effective agreement.

Until the Western Powers adopt a more sober position in regard to the realities of the present-day world, and until their verbal declarations about the political, moral and humanitarian reasons for the necessity of speeding up the adoption of disarmament measures are translated into deeds the motives of which are beyond doubt, the only result of our negotiations will be stacks of written paper with which to fill our archives. But such results are not at all in keeping with the hopes placed in us by the United Nations, world public opinion, and all the peoples of the world.

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): If the other speakers on the list have no objection, I shall call upon the representative of India, who has to leave for Copenhagen to keep an appointment. He will address us for only a few minutes.

Mr. LALL (India): I too am leaving to make some speeches elsewhere on disarmament, but I do want to say a few words today taking into account the two very important statements we have already heard.

First, I should like to say, with the greatest respect to both sides, that the Indian delegation is not of the view that there is insincerity with regard to disarmament negotiations on either side. On the contrary, we are convinced that both sides not only are sincere but are deeply conscious of the need to reach agreements in the field of disarmament, and that both sides, with a clear sense of responsibility, realize that the real solution to the problem of our present international insecurity is properly-safeguarded general and complete disarmament.

We think that it would be a great mistake for either side to regard the difference of approach of the other side towards disarmament problems as synonymous with insincerity or some game in relation to this very important subject. We do not take that view. We have, of course, often said here that neither disarmament plan can be accepted as it is; that is to say, in broad terms we do not hold any brief for the particular approach of either side to the issue of disarmament. We believe that agreement can only be reached by a process of give and take. But we do not regard -- and we would urge, request and appeal to the other members of this Committee not to regard -- the difference of approach as synonymous with insincerity concerning the extremely important task which has been entrusted to this Committee. We feel that that would be most unfortunate, and that it would mean that we would miss the opportunities of disarmament simply because we were misunderstanding each other's position. That would be a tragedy which we must avoid at all costs.

I should like to say a few words about the important statement made today by Mr. Burns (*supra*. pp. 5 *et seq.*). We listened with great interest to the three broad categories of questions which he said still remained, in his delegation's view, concerning Mr. Gromyko's proposal (A/PV.1127, provisional, p.38-40) of last September about the means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Lall, India)

With great respect, I would suggest to Mr. Burns that perhaps the first question he asked does not arise. I make that suggestion for this reason: surely, if instead of trying to analyse the conceptual basis of the Gromyko proposal we were to examine its effect, that would be sufficient guidance concerning its objective. Why should it be necessary for the two sides to reach common language in terms of concepts, provided that the effect is sufficiently clear? And, as Mr. Burns pointed out (supra, p.7), Mr. Tsarapkin -- who undoubtedly was correctly quoted -- did say at one stage that the proposal would have a deterrent effect. On the other hand, he was apparently unwilling to regard it as establishing a minimal nuclear deterrent.

The Indian delegation would suggest that the words do not matter, provided both sides are satisfied that a common objective has been reached. And we would therefore urge both sides not to give too much importance and too much emphasis to common concepts but, rather, to try to reach common practical agreements. We would think that from that point of view it might be possible -- and we simply suggest this -- not to put too much emphasis on the first of the questions asked by Mr. Burns.

The other two questions were eminently practical ones, and would obviously have to be answered at the right time.

It was interesting that the representative of Czechoslovakia (supra., p.11) seemed to feel that the clarification already given by the Soviet delegation, and by other delegations, was adequate, while Mr. Burns thought it was not. In that connexion the Indian delegation takes the general position that as much clarification as possible should be given on all issues, whichever side asks the questions. We think that if a proposal is worth considering it is obviously worth clarifying; and unless a proposal is clarified, how can further steps be taken with regard to it? So, in general, we would take the view that proposals, whenever they are worth considering, should be made as clear as possible. That would be a general approach to the matter.

I should like to say one more word. We agree with Mr. Burns on the extreme importance of the question of a decision on vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons. He said that an interesting proposal had been made by Mr. Gromyko, and that the Committee has been talking around that proposal for many meetings now. We would suggest that, either in the Committee or informally between the co-Chairmen,

(Mr. Lall, India)

consideration might be given to the possibility of variations of that proposal. In other words, there is the possibility that there might be a different date for the initiation of that proposal -- a different stage, as it were. There is the possibility that consideration might be given to when the arrangement should cease.

I hope I am not misquoting Mr. Blusztajn, but I think he said on one occasion that the arrangement of mutual dissuasion -- I believe that is what he called it, and I think he happily tried to coin a new concept and so get beyond the war of concepts, which was a very wise step -- could perhaps be brought to an end at an agreed moment. He did not say when that agreed moment would be. I think, however, that there is a possibility there for further useful consideration of the duration of such an arrangement.

Hence, as we study the Gromyko proposal we can see that it contains possibilities, perhaps through variations, to move us further forward in the solution of the problem of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. We would suggest that that might be considered, either in this Committee or in a less formal forum. Of course, this Committee itself was supposed originally to be an informal and off-the-record forum, but fortunately there is an even less formal forum available. We have armed the co-Chairmen with a special institution -- an institution which, I might say, Canada and India specially pressed for because we had found it worked so admirably in the Laos Conference. I am referring to the institution of co-chairmanship. It is a completely secluded arrangement, and we hope that it offers scope for clarification of some of these issues.

May I through you, Mr. Chairman, thank those representatives who have permitted me to speak out of turn?

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translation from French): At the meeting of the Committee, held on 24 April the Polish delegation put the following three questions to the Western delegations:

"First, do you agree that what you call 'atomic protection' should consist of an equal number of missiles kept by the two sides?

"Secondly, do you agree that this 'atomic protection' should be abolished at an agreed moment, but well before the end of the process of general and complete disarmament?

"Thirdly, would you be prepared to accept the Gromyko proposal provided that a system of control acceptable to all were worked out jointly?" (ENDC/PV.124, p.11)

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

The Polish delegation thought it worth while to ask these questions in order to obtain clear and precise replies concerning the position of the Western Powers on the proposal of the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gromyko, for a new method of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. (A/PV.1127, provisional, p.38-40)

We note with regret that the Western representatives' replies to these three questions are in the negative, and amount in fact to a rejection of the proposal. So we are at length quite clear about the position, and we know where we stand. I venture, however, to revert to the subject today because, in my view, it cannot be shelved on what appear to be the grounds for the latest stand taken by our Western colleagues.

I should like today to devote my remarks to the replies I received from the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber (ENDC/PV.124, pp. 22 et seq.). He was much more explicit than his United States colleague, although I should like to assure the latter that I studied with equal attention the remarks he made at the one hundred and twenty-fourth meeting.

The object of my first question, as will be recalled, was to obtain from the Western Powers a clear statement of their views on the structure of what they call "atomic protection" during the implementation of the disarmament plan. I must confess that I read and re-read Mr. Godber's reply to this question in an attempt to find the premises on which his reasoning is based. Quite frankly, I found it very difficult to understand. I shall therefore try to give you my own personal interpretation of Mr. Godber's reasoning; if I have gone wrong, I hope he will forgive me and make any corrections he deems necessary.

If I understand our United Kingdom colleague's reasoning aright, it is based on two premises. The first premise is that, although no formula can be found to define the balance of forces between East and West, the West has --

"... for this Conference, accepted the position that in fact there is at the present moment an uneasy balance of power; for what reasons and in what degree", says Mr. Godber, "are points that may be discussed, but it exists." (ibid.)

It seems to me quite clear from Mr. Godber's statement which I have just quoted that we have here a mere working hypothesis.

The second premise is the assertion that what a country thinks it needs for its own defence depends entirely on what a potential enemy might use against it.

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Accordingly, basing themselves on a mere working hypothesis, the Western Powers maintain that their plan for a percentage reduction in nuclear weapon delivery vehicles cannot upset the balance of forces, and that the achievement of numerical equality is possible only during the final stages of disarmament. This is also why Mr. Godber might possibly be prepared to agree to the implementation of the Gromyko plan at some unspecified point in the third stage of disarmament.

No one can of course be blamed for adopting a certain working hypothesis for his reasoning, provided always that he fully realizes both the limitations and the logical consequences of such a method. To found a disarmament plan on a working hypothesis may be a not unattractive intellectual exercise; but an international conference, inter-State negotiations on such an important subject as disarmament cannot in my opinion be treated in this way. A working hypothesis may be justified at a pinch if it helps to produce correct and acceptable conclusions. I am afraid that in the actual case before us we find a totally barren hypothesis that is bound to lead us into complete confusion.

What, in fact, would be the consequences if the Western idea of a percentage reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles were achieved? Let us not forget that this reduction has to be made in the following conditions. First, the balance of forces cannot be defined at the outset -- this Mr. Godber himself does not dispute. Secondly, the Western plan gives no details at all of the time when the final point of the process should be reached. Is it not clear that all this is tantamount to acceptance by States of a disarmament formula that would expose them to an unacceptable risk, that would increase as this so-called disarmament progressed without giving them solid guarantees of its completion?

To illustrate what I have just said, I venture to offer a theoretical analysis of the effects of the percentage reduction method in two hypothetical situations.

Take the first case: numerical disparity between the two parties at the start of the disarmament process -- a case which I do not think can be ruled out a priori. The effects of a percentage reduction will of course vary with the difference between the numbers concerned. At all events, a reduction of 30 per cent in the first stage will certainly aggravate the disparity, and a subsequent reduction of 30 per cent in the second stage will produce complete imbalance. Accordingly, contrary to what the Western delegations assert, not only shall we see no reduction in disproportions, but a percentage reduction will as it proceeds aggravate them.

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Now for the second case. Assume that a balance of forces exists at the start of the disarmament process. The elements of this balance are, however, not necessarily identical. It is possible, for instance, to imagine an overall balance based on two different strategic conceptions. Such a balance is conceivable even where the military potential of the parties is not equal, the disparity being due to differences in the roles which the parties allot to their respective armed forces.

No great military learning is needed to understand that in such a case a percentage reduction in nuclear weapon vehicles during the disarmament process might at some moment bring about a drastic change in the weight of specific elements in the initial strategic balance. This risk disappears if we adopt the method of eliminating nuclear weapon vehicles advocated by the Soviet Union. For by eliminating these vehicles at the start of the disarmament process we should immediately create a situation in which there would be no possibility of carrying out an atomic aggression, thus guaranteeing the balance of security of all States.

The same situation would result if we adopted the method proposed in the Gromyko plan, leaving a limited and equal number of missiles, together with anti-missile and ground-to-air defence missiles, in the hands of the Soviet Union and the United States in their respective territories. This would rule out the possibility of these missiles being used for aggressive purposes. The parity in missile potential of the two parties would thus become an effective means of ensuring the maintenance of an overall strategic balance during the disarmament process, the more so since the reduction of conventional armed forces, along with all the measures for the controlled limitation of production of conventional weapons, would ensure parity between the parties in all other fields.

I entirely agree with Mr. Godber that the defensive capacity a country thinks it needs to maintain depends entirely on what a potential enemy might use against it. But I believe at the same time that the Soviet disarmament plan can give him every reasonable guarantee on this score.

My second question was as follows: do you agree that this atomic protection should be abolished at an agreed moment, but well before the end of the process of general and complete disarmament? In replying to that question Mr. Godber stated that in his

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view the Soviet proposal should be implemented during the third stage of general and complete disarmament. So Mr. Godber evaded my question, and thus entitled me to interpret his reply to mean that what he calls "atomic protection" should in his opinion not be abolished until the end of the disarmament process, since, according to him, only then will States possess a system of safeguards for their security based on the creation of an international army.

I had already had occasion (ibid, p.38) to say that the Gromyko plan would lose its whole relevance if it were not implemented during the first stage of disarmament. I also had occasion to show that Mr. Godber's amendment would have taken all the pith out of it.

Today I should like to make a few remarks on the United Kingdom representative's assertion that the implementation of the Soviet proposal should depend on the creation of the international forces that are planned only for the third stage of disarmament (ibid, pp. 22, 23). In my opinion the United Kingdom point of view on this subject completely disregards, or seems to disregard, the guarantees of security already available to all States under the United Nations system. That system can and must, from the first stage of disarmament safeguard international security, provided of course that no step, such as the Western Powers desire, is taken to weaken it or replace it by other institutions. The United Nations has accumulated during its existence a rich store of experience, both positive and negative. Our main objective should therefore be, in accordance with article 18 of the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1), to take all useful measures to ensure effective action by the United Nations and to adapt its machinery to the needs of a disarmed world.

By contrast, what the Western Powers propose, namely the creation of a heavily-equipped international army with nuclear weapons and missiles at its disposal, an army entirely unjustifiable in a disarmed world, as well as the virtual liquidation of the United Nations system by the creation of all sorts of new international and supra-national institutions, can in no way help to ensure the security of States during the first, the second or the third stage of disarmament, or after completion of the process of general and complete disarmament.

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Mr. Godber's reply to my third question, concerning control (ENDC/PV.124, pp. 23, 24), is for me the best proof that the Western delegations are avoiding taking a clear-cut position on the proposal put to them. My question was nevertheless quite precise and offered us the chance to start working out a control system acceptable to all. But instead of giving me a concrete answer the United Kingdom representative raised several preliminary problems. I must say it is not the first time that we have met with such tactics. They have been used by the West several times in the past. The purpose is to try and dissociate the control problem from concrete disarmament measures and to consider it in the abstract. Need I say that such tactics will lead nowhere?

I should, however, like to deal with a question which keeps coming up in the arguments of our Western colleagues when we talk about control and in particular about the problem of clandestine weapons. They would give anything to convince us that this problem arises only in connexion with the Soviet disarmament plan and would not exist if the Western proposals (ENDC/30) were adopted. I think we have here another case of a false conclusion reached from an arbitrary working hypothesis. At all events, I think we can assert that, if the Western delegations believe the problem of clandestine weapons does not arise in connexion with their proposals, it is because, as they themselves admit, the disarmament measures which they propose for the first and second stages are devoid of concrete significance. Otherwise the danger of clandestine weapons would be no less than the danger they think they can detect in the implementation of the proposals submitted by the Soviet Union.

But I think it might be worth while for the Committee to recall at this point the position adopted by the United Kingdom delegation on this problem in the document it submitted on 1 August 1962. This document, you will remember, was entitled "Preliminary study of problems connected with the elimination of rockets as nuclear delivery vehicles". (ENDC/53) One part of this study, entitled "Verification of destruction and chances of evasion", deals with the problem of clandestine weapons. It stresses that it would be easy effectively to control the destruction of nuclear weapon vehicles as well as their production. At the same time it notes that it would

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be difficult to detect stockpiles of missiles which had been concealed before the start of the disarmament process. But, the authors of this study do not despair. They assert that the problem could be solved by establishing on-site control to verify the destruction of missile launching sites. Of sites which might be concealed, they say that:

"... very considerable effort would have been expended in carrying out such an operation; the existence of the sites would be known to many of the local population, and extreme security precautions would have to be taken to prevent compromising any such evasion plan." (ibid, p.4)

As you know, the Soviet delegation has agreed to the establishment of on-site control at points where missile launching sites exist (ENDC/PV.114, p.40). I think that in the very light of the views expressed in the United Kingdom document submitted to the Committee on 1 August 1962 such control, linked with control of the destruction of nuclear weapon vehicles and of the ban on their production, practically eliminates the dangers arising from the problem of clandestine weapons.

Let me ask Mr. Godber one more question. The Western plan for a percentage reduction in nuclear weapon vehicles (ENDC/30, pp.4 et seq.) would still leave States at the end of the first stage of disarmament with 70 per cent of their potential in such vehicles, and compliance with this undertaking would be checked by zones -- that is to say, by the sampling method (ibid., p. 14). Which disarmament plan therefore constitutes the greater risk: the Western plan, under which States will retain enough resources to carry out a surprise attack and many launching sites will be subject to no control; or the Soviet plan, which would only leave a minimal quantity of missiles in the hands of the two great nuclear Powers and would place all launching sites under strict on-site control?

From the replies I have received to my questions from the United Kingdom representatives, I think I am entitled to draw the following conclusions:

1. The Western Powers reject the principle of parity in what they call "atomic protection" during the disarmament process because they think they can ensure their own superiority in nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles through their own

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percentage reduction plan. This attitude is in flagrant contradiction with Agreed Principle 5, adopted by the United States and the Soviet Union and accepted by this Committee as a guide to our work (ENDC/5). It is in flagrant contradiction with the principle of balance of security for all, without which no disarmament is possible.

2. The Western Powers persist in wanting to keep nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles until, and even after, the end of disarmament, so as to base international order on atomic terror. That is a vision of the very future of a disarmed world that must revolt the conscience of mankind.

3. The arguments on control are merely a pretext to evade serious discussion of the disarmament plan submitted by the Soviet Union. The truth is that with the adoption of that plan the solution of the control problem becomes much easier than it would have been if the Western disarmament plan were to be implemented.

The Polish delegation continues to hope that the Western Powers will agree to reconsider their attitude in the light of our discussion. We for our part have given every proof of our readiness to consider and to adopt any constructive proposal capable of advancing our work. I think it is time our Western colleagues did the same.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): At our meeting of 24 April the United States and the United Kingdom delegations proposed (ENDC/PV.124, pp.21, 36) that the debate on items 5(b) and 5(c) of our agenda be regarded as ended and that we proceed to the next item, referring the earlier items to the two co-Chairmen for appropriate study.

The United States delegation also made a provisional assessment of the Gromyko proposal (4/PV.1127, provisional, pp.38-40), which was considered by the Committee during the debate on items 5(b) and 5(c). My Delegation gave its views on Mr. Gromyko's proposal on 27 March (ENDC/PV.114, pp. 13 et seq.), it knows of no subsequent new developments that would cause it to change its views. In the hope of finding bridges between our positions and Mr. Gromyko's proposal, the Western

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delegations have questioned the Soviet delegation at some length. Whilst thanking the Soviet delegation for the clarifications which it has given us, we must regretfully state that they are inadequate for a clear understanding of Mr. Gromyko's proposal. Many points in that proposal are still obscure, especially in regard to control, and they include the following.

The Soviet delegation has assured us that control will be allowed over the quantities of inter-continental missiles retained (ENDC/PV.124, pp. 19 et seq.); but it does not seem to me to have given the same assurance in regard to vehicles other than these missiles. There we are concerned with a vast quantity of all sorts of devices whose liquidation, to be carried out during the first stage, poses very serious problems. This elimination cannot be done all at once, it will inevitably take a fairly long time to complete. Meanwhile considerable quantities of vehicles will still be available. The question arises: what control can be exercised over these remaining quantities before their total destruction?

Moreover, when at the end of the first stage we have achieved the complete destruction of these vehicles, how will control be exercised? On the principle -- which is, I believe, also accepted by the Soviet delegation -- that total control must go hand in hand with total disarmament, the international inspectors should then presumably -- all vehicles having been eliminated and disarmament being complete in that sector -- enjoy complete freedom of action and access throughout the territory of a country to ensure that there are no nuclear vehicles concealed. But the Committee has received no explanation or assurance from the Soviet delegation on this score.

I still hope that the Soviet delegation will see its way to provide the clarifications requested; but, if it thinks it has given us all the explanations it could, we can only bow to its wishes. It would therefore be worth while to proceed with the other agenda items, on the understanding that we can at any time revert to the Gromyko proposal if the Soviet delegation is prepared to provide us with new constructive data.

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At the present stage all we can do is to note that the Gromyko proposal represents a limited advance on two points: the abandonment of the original Soviet position, the Utopian demand for the liquidation of all nuclear weapons from the start of disarmament (ENDC/2, article 5); and the recognition -- though partial and incomplete -- of the principle of control over certain remaining quantities of armaments.

However, the Soviet plan as it now stands (ENDC/2/Rev.1), with due regard to the Gromyko proposal, implies military advantages for one of the parties, which my delegation has several times indicated. I do not want at this stage to re-open discussion on the concept of balance, of which the Polish representative has once more spoken this morning. Some delegations would recently have liked to replace the expression "balance of armaments" by "balance of security". This latter expression, it must be stressed, is much wider in its connotation and must necessarily include, among other things, the geographical factor. But in any case, however this balance may be defined, what is meant is always military balance; and military balance comprises several factors, some directly related to armaments, both conventional and nuclear, and others related to geographical situation.

A country must first consider its geographical situation and then make its defence plans with close regard to that situation. This also applies to a group of States that have to plan their defence in common and to pool their military resources. It is no less true for a country or a group of countries which decides, without renouncing security, to put an end to the arms race and gradually reduce armaments until they are completely eliminated.

At the present time, in view of scientific progress, the geographical factor may have undergone some modifications; but it is nevertheless still the foundation of defence and strategic planning. We, the countries of Western Europe, are specially obliged to examine every disarmament proposal from that angle and to reject any that would tend to dislocate our defence organization and tip the balance against us before the disarmament process is far enough under way and an international security force is formed.

We do not want to make alliances eternal or to maintain the threat of atomic weapons for long -- still less for ever. We want rapid and effective disarmament, spread in a balanced way over conventional and atomic weapons, covering a series of stages, based on fair criteria, and advantageous to neither party but solely to the cause of peace.

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In that connexion, I note with pleasure the remark just made by the representative of India (supra, p.16) that the differences in approach between us should not cast doubts on the good will of the countries taking part in these negotiations. These differences in approach should in fact lead us, not into mutual attacks and barren polemics, but to further serious efforts to accomplish our task.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): Since the Soviet proposal (A/PV.1127, provisional pp. 38-40) for the retention of a certain number of specific nuclear weapon delivery vehicles until the end of stage II was introduced in our Committee last fall, a large number of meetings have been devoted to a discussion of the subject. In the course of that discussion, my delegation has consistently sought to obtain from the Soviet delegation clarification and elaboration of the proposal so as to be able to assess it in all of its implications.

Unfortunately, in spite of our efforts we now know hardly anything more about the proposal than when it was first introduced. In essence, the Soviet delegation has responded to our inquiries about the various aspects of the Gromyko proposal with generalized statements which shed very little additional light on it. On the contrary, the Soviet delegation has demanded that the West accept the Soviet proposal in principle before any more detailed discussion takes place.

On 24 April the Soviet representative reiterated that demand when he said "What we now need to get from the Western Powers is a simple and clear answer to the question: do they or do they not agree to eliminate the danger of a nuclear missile war by eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons while the United States and the Soviet Union would retain a small strictly--limited number of missiles of certain types until the end of stage II of disarmament" (ENDC/PV.124, p.19)

Our answer to that question is simple and clear: the United States has proposed (ENDC/30) that all armaments, including nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, be reduced substantially in the first stage, be cut back still more drastically in the second stage, and be eliminated entirely from the arsenals of States by the end of stage III. The levels of armaments which would be reached at the end of stage II under the United States proposal would be quite low. Indeed, they would constitute only about one-third of the levels existing at the beginning of the disarmament process.

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The objectives stated by both sides with regard to what should happen to armaments by the end of stage II appear to us to be basically similar, as both say that the levels of armaments at that point should be quite low. The differences, we believe, lie in the way that objective is to be defined, in the methods advocated by each side for reaching it, and in their views about the effect their respective proposals would have on the security of States and the danger of nuclear war.

The United States has set forth in considerable detail its position on measures dealing with reduction of armaments, and it has set forth also some suggestions on how those measures could be verified. It believes that its proposals providing for a gradual, progressive across-the-board percentage reduction of armaments offer the most feasible and the most equitable way of reducing armaments without jeopardizing the security of any State.

The Polish representative this morning had quite a few, as they seemed to me, misleading statements to make about the equity of the United States plan. I do not intend to deal with the various points he raised, but I must say that one of them completely puzzled me. He said (supra, p.20) that, in a case where two sides started with an unequal number of armaments, a percentage reduction in the first stage would accentuate the inequality, and that a further reduction in the second stage would create definite imbalance. He did not explain those statements, and I do not follow his logic.

Suppose we take a simple mathematical example. If one side starts with, let us say, 1,000 missiles, and the other side with 500, at the beginning one side has 50 per cent of the number of missiles that the other side has. If there is a 30 per cent reduction in the first stage, at the end of the first stage one side will have 700 missiles and the other side 350. The percentage relationship will still be that one side has 50 per cent of what the other side has. The absolute numerical relationship will be that, instead of a difference of 500 missiles to begin with, there will now be a difference of only 350 missiles. And if we apply the percentage reduction in the second stage called for by the United States plan, that is 50 per cent of the missiles remaining at the end of the first stage, then the number of missiles remaining will be 350 for one side and 175 for the other. There will still be a 50 per cent relationship between the number on one side and the number on the other, but by that time the numerical difference will have been reduced from the initial 500

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to 175. I do not see how the Polish representative could argue that the inequality was accentuated, and that imbalance was created by a percentage reduction. I must say that I thought his other comments were similarly misleading, but I shall not deal with them now.

We believe that the United States proposals are sound and equitable. We freely admit that the measures contained in our proposals for stage I and stage II would not definitely eliminate the danger of nuclear war, for that danger will remain as long as there are even a few nuclear bombs in existence. However, we believe the measures we propose would change the international atmosphere, halt and reverse the arms race, greatly reduce the danger of nuclear war, and pave the way for ultimate total elimination of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of States.

On the other hand the Soviet delegation, in advancing its proposal concerning nuclear weapon delivery vehicles at the end of stage II, has failed to elaborate it to an extent sufficient for us to assess to what degree it really departs from the previous Soviet position, which provided for the total elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in stage I. It is clearly imperative for us to know what the Soviet Union envisages under its proposal in order to be able to see how much, if indeed at all, our positions are closer now compared with the situation which existed prior to the submission of the Soviet proposal. For that purpose my delegation has asked the Soviet Union to provide it with additional information, at least in the following three general areas.

First, we asked how far and in what respects the Soviet proposal departed from the approach of a 30 per cent across-the-board reduction advocated by the United States as the most realistic and suitable method of armaments reduction, as well as what specific reduction the Soviet Union had in mind. Also we noted that, if the Soviet proposal implied a cut in United States intercontinental strategic vehicles, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles and long-range bombers, by a percentage greater than for the Soviet Union, that would increase the complexity of the problem, and we asked the Soviet delegation for clarification on the extent of and justification for any such proposed disparity.

Secondly, we asked for at least some general indication of the ranges of numbers and categories of armaments that the Soviet Union had in mind in its proposal. We clearly need to know which armaments the Soviet Union proposes to reduce by 30 per cent, which by 100 per cent, and which by a percentage or amount in between.

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Finally, the third area in which we asked for clarification of the Soviet attitude was that of verification.

In response to our first two questions we may say that the Soviet delegation has not given us any significant information. All we have heard is that the levels to be retained should be such as would eliminate the possibility of aggression or the danger of nuclear war, and that as far as specific levels and specific methods of implementation are concerned the Soviet delegation would be prepared to consider the views of the West. The United States position on the levels of armaments which should be reached by the end of stage II and the ways of reaching such levels are well known to the Soviet Union and to the other members of the Committee. As we said earlier, reduction to those levels admittedly would not completely eliminate the danger of nuclear war. But neither would any level achieve that objective -- except total elimination, which, we submit is realistic only at the end of the disarmament process. We find it rather strange for a delegation claiming to have advanced a compromise proposal to invite the other side to describe what it really is. It is clearly up to the Soviet delegation to provide the West with its views on what, in its opinion, constitutes the compromise it claims to have made, if indeed it is a compromise at all.

It is only in connexion with our third question -- that relating to the problem of verification -- that the Soviet delegation has shed at least some additional light on its position. As my delegation stated earlier, Soviet willingness to admit inspection of the delivery vehicles authorized to be retained represents a welcome step, as far as it goes. However, in our view it is by far inadequate to meet the problem. The main concern which States would have would be not about whether another Power had actually retained the missiles authorized at an agreed level but, rather, about the possibility of the clandestine retention or subsequent clandestine production by the other Power of armaments over and beyond the agreed level. It is that concern that has prompted the United States to explore possible ways of providing the necessary assurance.

The Soviet delegation has so far been completely negative on that most important point. On 24 April the Soviet representative even referred to "imaginary hidden missiles or means adapted as nuclear weapon carriers" (ENDC/PV.124, p.20), and asserted that they would not suffice to carry out a surprise attack or achieve any serious strategic purpose. But there is nothing imaginary about the feasibility

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of hiding missiles in a country of large area. It is definitely a possibility in physical terms. Indeed, the Soviet representative has said that the objective of his new control proposal was to provide assurances that the levels retained were those which had been agreed. But if the possibility of a State's exceeding that level were only imaginary, then what would be the purpose of verifying it? Surely it would not be to see that the actual level was not lower than the one agreed. It would be the opposite. My delegation is confident that the Soviet delegation itself recognizes the somewhat fanciful quality of the verification measures proposed by it, and perhaps that is the reason why the Soviet representatives make references to imaginary measures.

Recent discussions of the Soviet proposal seem to show quite clearly that the Soviet delegation is not prepared to provide us with any appreciable amount of information beyond what Foreign Minister Gromyko himself gave in introducing his proposal at the United Nations General Assembly as far back as September last. Hence we are compelled to draw one of the following conclusions: either the Soviet Union has not yet thought through its proposal, and is therefore unable to provide its delegation here with any material for meaningful discussion, or the proposal was put forward only for propaganda purposes and the Soviet Union therefore cannot engage in any serious exploration of it.

For our part, we are reluctant to accept the latter conclusion. We would much prefer to believe that the former is correct, for we continue to believe that the Soviet Union must realize, just as we do, that it is in the interest of both sides to stop the arms race and to start us on the path of balanced and equitable disarmament through measures which, while reversing the trend and reducing the levels of existing armaments, would at the same time protect the security of all concerned and thereby be acceptable to both sides.

At the same time, we have believed it useful for the Soviet delegation to know what preliminary conclusions the United States delegation has reached about the Soviet proposal on the basis of the meagre information we have available. On 24 April (ENDC/PV.124, pp. 32 et seq.) my delegation put forward some of those conclusions in the hope that that might help the Soviet delegation to develop its thoughts further about the problems involved, thus facilitating our search for a mutually-acceptable arrangement for reduction of armaments.

My delegation was frankly disheartened by the Soviet representative's immediate response to our statement. We were disheartened not so much by the fact that he

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disagreed with us as by the obvious lack of substance in his response, which only reinforced our impression that the Soviet delegation is not in a position, at least at this time, to discuss its own proposal in any meaningful way. Indeed, his statement seemed empty of logic, and his arguments in response to our statement that the Soviet proposal appeared to overburden the initial stage of disarmament were a completely inaccurate characterization of the United States position.

The Soviet representative said (ibid., p.40) that what the West was proposing was that everything be postponed until stage III and that the first two stages be reduced to a minimum. But everyone here knows very well that the United States is proposing nothing of the sort. The United States proposal provides for reductions in armaments by approximately one-third in each stage. There is clearly no question of postponing everything to stage III, as the Soviet representative contends.

Mr. Tsarapkin also seemed to be extremely short of arguments in response to our comments on the effect the Soviet proposal would have on the existing military balance, as well as to our criticism of the Soviet position on verification. On that latter point he claimed that it was "frivolous when we are told that apparently someone is going to hide a missile the size of a ten-storey house" (ibid., p.41). Unfortunately the recent experience in the Caribbean is sufficient proof, to our mind, that if a State were determined to engage in secret deployment of strategic weapons it could do so undetected, at least for a certain period, even in the near proximity of another State which would be the potential victim. How much easier that would be in the distant and inaccessible heartland of some other State! And in these weapons, as we all know, a successful clandestine build-up even for a short time could have the most serious consequences for the security of States and for peace.

We do not wish to engage in any detailed argument with the Soviet delegation at this point. It is quite true, of course, that with regard to items 5(b) and 5(c) of our agenda (ENDC/1/Add.3) we still have a long way to go to achieve agreement. However, it seems to my delegation that the discussions which we have been having on those items during recent meetings, while useful in certain respects, have not really advanced us in our efforts to obtain a clearer and fuller picture of what the Soviet proposal means. In fact, instead of providing us with the necessary information about its proposal, the Soviet delegation has unfortunately tended to engage in polemics which cannot but adversely affect our negotiations.

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My delegation believes, as we have said before, that rather than continue this type of debate we should, in an effort to advance our work, put aside items 5(b) and 5(c) for the time being by referring them to the two co-Chairmen for further exploration, as the representatives of India and Italy suggested this morning (supra, p. 18).. We could then move on in our plenary discussions to the next topic on our agreed agenda. That topic is of the utmost importance, as it deals with measures in the nuclear field. We could surely use our time more profitably in discussing the respective proposals in that area.

This morning the Czechoslovak representative (supra, pp. 12-13) made some inaccurate comments on what the United States draft treaty provides for, and we shall be happy to correct them at a later meeting. In fact, the United States proposals contain a series of provisions for stage I measures which would have a very profound effect on the nuclear arms race. These measures, if implemented, would halt the nuclear arms race by arresting and reducing the nuclear weapon capabilities of States in stage I. They would also prevent proliferation of independent nuclear capabilities to additional States, and would freeze the advancement of nuclear weapons technology.

The question of nuclear armaments and of how they should be gradually reduced with a view to eliminating them completely from the arsenals of States at the end of the process of general and complete disarmament is unquestionably one of the most important and difficult problems we have to solve. For our part, we should like to discuss the possible methods of beginning the process of nuclear disarmament in stage I in a spirit of businesslike and realistic examination of all facets of the problem. We hope that when that examination begins, as we believe it should in the immediate future, the Soviet delegation for its part, will display a realistic, responsive and constructive attitude.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): My well known reluctance to address my colleagues in this Committee has resulted once more in my taking the floor at a moment when we are approaching lunch-time. On this occasion I might be permitted to continue for a relatively short time, and I hope it will not incommode my colleagues too much. I should like to do so particularly because I have listened with interest this morning, as I usually do, to our colleague from Poland, and he did me the honour of referring to me on so many occasions that it became almost embarrassing. Such flattery from such a source always occasions me concern.

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The representative of Poland took up (supra, pp.18 et seq.)-- and i am very glad he did so -- the answers which I ventured to give on a previous occasion (ENDC/FV.124, pp.22-24) to certain questions he asked. I appreciate very much the care with which he has studied my answers. I would interpose, however, that he has had a fortnight in which to study them, and I have had only a few moments in which to consider his reaction. I should like to indicate here that if some of our colleagues from the Eastern bloc would answer our questions as punctually and as emphatically as I am answering them, it might facilitate our further progress.

On this occasion I wish to comment briefly on the interpretations our Polish colleague placed on my answers. As far as my first answer is concerned, he said that I had based it on a hypothesis and that he could not reproach anyone for adopting a hypothesis provided he realized its limitations. I would refer again to what I said on that occasion. I should have thought that my hypothesis was fairly indisputable -- if, indeed it was a hypothesis. I said then:

"We cannot, in my view, seek to set up a mathematically-exact balance of power." (ENDC/FV.124. p.22)

There I was agreeing with a quotation, which the Polish representative himself had given (ibid., p.5) earlier that day, from Mr. Foster Dulles. I went on to say:

"... in fact there is at the present moment an uneasy balance of power" (ibid., p.22)

That was really the hypothesis from which I drew my answer. I would suggest that it was a fairly realistic hypothesis, if hypothesis it be -- rather more realistic than that of our Polish colleague himself earlier that day, for when he was referring to this matter he said, after quoting Mr. Dulles:

"The quest for a balance of forces justifies arbitrary acts; it serves as a pretext for accelerating the armaments race and taking military measures which endanger others' security." (ibid. p.6)

If that was his hypothesis, I prefer mine.

I would add that Mr. Blusztajn went on then to refer to the Western position on the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles, and made the comment (supra, pp.20-21) that with a 30 per cent reduction inequality would increase, and that a 65 per cent reduction would bring complete imbalance. The representative of the United States dealt with that point very fully this morning (supra, p.29). I think I need not labour it further, except to say that it seemed from the Polish representative's

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argument that he was assuming that Western nuclear power was substantially greater than that of the Soviet Union. If he did not mean that, his argument had no validity in relation to the point he was seeking to make. That seemed to be the clear indication. However, I gather from his present attitude that that was not entirely what he meant. I was going to remind him that one of his own allies, shall we say, the representative of the Soviet Union, speaking at our meeting on 10 April, after referring to something Marshal Malinovsky had said went on to say:

"It follows quite clearly from this text ... that NATO has neither qualitative nor quantitative superiority in intercontinental ballistic missiles." (ENDC/FV.120, p.37)

So if, in fact, there is a rough equality here, I do not see the point of the argument against percentage reduction.

Perhaps I might confirm this by another quotation from no less a person than Mr. Khrushchev himself who, speaking on 24 April of this year, said:

"The Soviet Union now has the most highly developed types of weapons to repulse aggressive forces. Even the leaders of imperialism admit that the strengths of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries are equal to the forces of the imperialist countries. Admitting this in words, they feel in fact that the growing strength of socialism is now already superior to the strength of the imperialist Powers."

If those assertions -- hypotheses, if you will -- are correct, then I cannot understand the emphasis that our Polish colleague used when arguing today against percentage reductions. I would say to him that the percentage reduction still seems to me to be the most realistic. It was a point I made in relation to his first question, but I made it clear that there should arrive a stage during the third stage of disarmament when the suggestion in the Gromyko proposal might have relevance. That is the position as I put it then. I still maintain it now. With the greatest respect, I feel that none of the arguments that the Polish representative has adduced this morning would lead me to change my mind on that.

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Concerning his second question, he said (supra, pp.21-22) that my answer implied that we would not accept the Gromyko proposal until the very end of the third stage. That is not what I said. What I said was (ENDC/FV.124, pp.22,23) that it would have to be related to the establishment of peace-keeping forces; and then I went on to remind him that the Soviet Union does not envisage peace-keeping forces coming into effect until the third stage. He could well have taken the opposite view, had he chosen, and said that the Soviet Union and its colleagues were now convinced, because of the arguments I have used, that they should bring forward their references to peace-keeping to an earlier stage in order to justify their other proposals. That would have been a more logical approach.

He went on, in relation to the whole question of peace-keeping, to say that we should not disregard the security offered by the United Nations and that the United Nations can and must ensure international security (supra, p.22). I hope he is right. I should like very much to be absolutely confident of that. However, it is quite clear from the plans put forward both by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1, art.2) and by the United States (ENDC/30, pp.12 et seq.) that both envisage clearly the need for the peace-keeping forces to be built up as disarmament proceeds. The Soviet Union, as well as the United States, keeps that clearly in mind. Why do they both do so?

Surely they do so because the Charter of the United Nations was written for a world in which national armaments existed and, as far as could be foreseen at that time, were likely to continue to exist. The Charter was prepared for the purpose of keeping the peace in the world, in conditions in which national forces still continued to play a very substantial part. What we are envisaging -- all of us here -- is a position in which those national forces disappear and their place has to be taken by, I would suggest, very considerable international forces to enable the task to be carried out properly. I think that is a basic point which none of us must try to blur in any way.

If we are to achieve general and complete disarmament, as we must, then we have to face up to these problems of peace-keeping and to realize the need for adequate peace-keeping forces, controlled in such a way as we must discuss far more fully here. Certainly, using the United Nations as an umbrella has been the idea of all of us, but very substantial forces of some form or other will have to be provided in some way.

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I therefore say to our Polish colleague that his argument this morning did not seem to face up to the problems, and that I adhere to my position that we must have those forces at least established in such a form that we all can have confidence in them before the two sides abolish the nuclear deterrent, on which unfortunately both have still to reply.

As to his third question concerning clandestine weapons, to which I drew particular attention, he used some very odd arguments indeed. As I understood him, he said at one stage -- and I hope I am not misquoting him in any way -- that if the problem of clandestine weapons does not arise with the Western proposals, that must show that the proposals themselves could not represent effective disarmament; and he referred (supra, p.23) to one of our working papers (ENDC/53) and quoted from it. But surely the whole point here is that under the Western proposals we are willing to have complete verification, not only of what is destroyed but also of what remains, and we have always shown complete willingness, a readiness, to have that full verification cover all aspects

That was, of course, the one basic difference in the Agreed Principles: that we in the West have always accepted the need for adequate and complete verification of remaining forces and for those limits of remaining forces not to be exceeded. It has never been accepted by the Soviet Union at any stage, and that has really been one of the main stumbling-blocks of this Conference up to now. Zonal inspection was proposed by the United States in a genuine effort to compromise with the Soviet Union, to find a mutually-agreeable solution between the two opposing positions. I am still awaiting a Soviet solution of this problem, and I do say that if we are to succeed it really is necessary for the Soviet Union to come forward with some proposals which take account, on the one hand, of its own criticisms and fears about espionage, and, on the other hand, of the feeling we have that there must be adequate provision not only for inspection to verify what remains, but also for inspection to see that no clandestine weapons are hidden. There too I could not find anything in the comments of our Polish colleague which nullified in any way the comments I had made. Again, these are immediate reactions to the points he put forward.

As I say, I have tried once more to answer him promptly, and having done that I would suggest that perhaps the Soviet Union or some of its colleagues here might care to answer some of the questions we have posed. We and our United States, Canadian and Italian colleagues have all posed questions at various times. Our United States colleague this morning asked some more questions or, rather, repeated previous ones.

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Perhaps I might remind our Soviet colleague very briefly of some of the questions which the United Kingdom has put.

First, is Mr. Gromyko's proposal a firm one in specifying exclusively land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles? If so, why are seaborne missiles excluded? That I have dealt with fully in previous statements.

Secondly, why has Mr. Gromyko's proposal not been related to the third stage, in view of the fact that no adequate peace-keeping machinery is envisaged in stage II? That I have just been dealing with. We have never had a clear answer on that.

Thirdly, how does the Soviet Government propose to stage and phase the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles from existing levels to the levels it envisages under the Gromyko proposal, bearing in mind any disparities which may exist at the beginning of the reduction process and the need to maintain the balance of security at any given time throughout the process? This is not done by waving a wand, and we want to know a good deal more about the process by which the reduction is carried out. I think our Canadian colleague has dealt with that at some length in the past.

Fourthly, how many nuclear delivery vehicles will be sufficient, in the Soviet view, to deter all possible risk of aggression? Our Soviet colleague has been very reluctant to answer that question. If he does not want to state a specific number -- and I can see a reason for that -- let him at least indicate the area within which he thinks the point would be negotiable, so that we may have some idea of the sort of numbers he is talking about.

Fifthly, why are anti-missile missiles still included in the Gromyko proposal? Our delegation has referred to this several times -- my colleague, Sir Paul Mason, did so on 22 March (ENDC/PV.112, p.10) and on 3 April (ENDC/PV.117, p.15) -- but we still have had no reply.

Sixthly, what verification measures does the Soviet Government propose with regard to this whole proposal? I have just been discussing that. I merely list it again as one of the questions to which we must have clear answers.

I have repeated those questions, but I, like others who have spoken this morning, feel that it would probably be most helpful for our work now if at our meeting next Wednesday we were to pass to the next item on our agenda (ENDC/1/Add.3) namely item 5(d). I am sure that in this I shall have the warm support of our Czechoslovak colleague, because most of his speech this morning seemed to be directed to item 5(d), and I know that he would wish to be in consort with the rest of us in discussing the same subject

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next Wednesday. Therefore, as I have also had a clear indication that other colleagues feel that we should move on, I would hope that next Wednesday we should be able -- and it would certainly be our own intention -- to address our minds more particularly to that problem.

The hour is late and I do not propose to continue, although I might have made many other points. I felt it only courteous to our Polish colleague to respond to him immediately. I hope that this immediate response to questions may prove infectious to others in this Conference who might respond similarly.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(translation from Russian):

The statement I should like to make is not a very brief one, but the time is already ten minutes past one, and if I begin to speak I shall detain the whole Committee for nearly an hour. If there is no objection on the part of the Committee, I can start now. If, however, you prefer to respect the luncheon hour, it will then, of course, be appropriate to postpone my statement until our next meeting.

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): What is the preference of the members of the Committee? Perhaps they have standing engagements for luncheon, in which event it might be best for us to hear the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union on Friday, or, if it is agreeable to him, on Wednesday of next week. Shall it be Wednesday of next week? Since I hear no objection, I take it that that is agreed.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and twenty-ninth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Mbu, representative of Nigeria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Canada, Czechoslovakia, India, Poland, Italy, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 10 May 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.